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Abstract 
                                              
The size and forms of assistance to Afghanistan by Japan after the 9.11 terrorist attacks 
to the United States of America as well as its basic policy on the country were decided 
by the summer 2002, and have unchanged until now.  The main reason for this is lack 
of attention of the higher authorities and mass media in Japan.  Since last year summer, 
those attention has soared the second time.  This, together with a new strategy of the 
U.S.A. opens a precious opportunity for Japan to change the policy towards Afghanistan 
and adjust its assistance to the grand situation of the country.  The discussion paper 
raises seven points on Japan’s assistance to Afghanistan: attention by the higher 
authorities and mass media; volume; strategy; local coordination; capacity; 
Afghanistan’s ownership; and security.  And it draw lessons from the past assistance of 
Japan and discusses on its possible future assistance based on the author’s experiences 
as director in charge of the Foreign Ministry of Japan and Deputy Chief of Mission in 
Kabul and his researches since summer 2004. 
 
 
 
                    
When the 9.11 terrorist attacks to the United States in 2001 occurred, I was Director of 
the Second Middle East Division, Japanese Foreign Ministry, which deals with 
Afghanistan.  Since that time, I had deeply been involved in planning and 
implementing Japanese foreign policy towards peace and stability of Afghanistan as 
GRIPS Policy Information Center  Discussion Paper 09-03
1
Director and as Deputy Chief of Mission （DCM）of the Japanese Embassy in Kabul by 
summer 2004.  After I left Kabul for good, I have been following the situation of 
Afghanistan and the Japanese assistance to Afghanistan as a professional fellow of the 
Weatherhead East Asia Institute of Columbia University in New York and then as an 
academic of Kureme University.  The followings are my comments on Japan’s 
assistance to Afghanistan based on my experiences and researches. 
 
1. Attention by the higher authorities and mass media 
 
Japan’s assistance to Afghanistan has been affected by the strength of attention by the 
higher authorities and mass media of Japan in the term of decision making of size and 
forms of assistance.  Their attention to the issue of Afghanistan was the highest for less 
than one year after the 9.11 terrorist attacks.  In October 2002, two weeks after I 
arrived as DCM of the Japanese Embassy one of the Diet members of the Democratic 
Party visited Kabul and said to me, “Nobody cares Afghanistan now except me.  
Political attention was turned to Iraq.”   
 
During those nine to ten months, Japan made several political moves.  Japan clearly 
accused a barbarian act of terrorism by the Al-Qaeda and contributed to forming 
coalition against terrorism by dispatching the Prime Minister’s special envoys to Islamic 
countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.  The Diet of Japan passed the 
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to allow the Japan Self-Defense Maritime Force 
to make replenishment support to vessels engaged in the counter-terrorism Maritime 
Interdiction activities in the Indian Ocean.  In cooperation and coordination with the 
United States, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and the United Nations, Japan played 
a significant role to form a reconstruction process for Afghanistan, which led to the 
Tokyo International Conference for Afghanistan Reconstruction.   
 
Most importantly for the officials and experts getting engaged in assistance 
implementation, the size and forms of assistance by Japan were decided in this period, 
and have unchanged until now.  Japan made US$ 1.46 billion of assistance to 
Afghanistan by the end of 2008 since September 2001, which was almost equivalent to 
US$ 200 million.  At the Tokyo conference, Japan made a pledge of US$ 500 million 
for two and a half years.  In addition to humanitarian assistance, Japan set three pillars 
for its assistance to Afghanistan, namely contributions to the political process, security 
sector reform, and reconstruction, although the Foreign Ministry of Japan calls these the 
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former two areas ‘Democratic Process’ and ‘Security Improvement’ now.  Besides, the 
means of assistance has not changed: use of ODA present schemes. 
 
It is at the present time since last year that the political and public attention soared 
second time.  It was reported summer last year that the United States requested Japan 
to dispatch a transport unit of military helicopters for logistic support for the 
International Security Assistance Force or to provide US$ 20 billion financial assistance 
to the security improvement.  Since then, I have closely watched the discussions of the 
politicians and officials from the viewpoint whether Japan can change the size or/and 
forms of assistance or not. 
 
2. Volume 
 
Japan is the third largest donor to Afghanistan now.  However, Japan was the second 
largest contributor after the United States.  At the Tokyo conference, Japan made a 
pledge of US$ 250 million for the first year while the United States did that of just less 
than US$ 300 million.  From that time the size of Japanese assistance in the financial 
term has not changed or been stable while the other countries such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom rapidly increased their contributions.  In fact, I was 
astonished to know that the United States pledged US$ 2 billion of assistance only for 
reconstruction in the middle of 2003, though the contents and volume of 
implementation was criticized by the press and researchers in the United States.   
 
Afghanistan has been one of the least recipients of foreign assistance as a post-conflict 
country per capita.  It received far below compared with Bosnia and East Timor.   
 
Excuse of the international community for this fact is that Afghanistan is far larger than 
other post-conflict countries such as Bosnia and East Timor in area and population.  As 
for Japan, the financial shortage of the national budget is added for the excuse.  
Besides, political and public attention has been very low in Japan, as I previously 
mentioned. 
 
Japan is the second largest economy in the world, being conscious about its moral 
obligation to contribute to issues in the world, even the time when the world economy is 
at a crisis.  The political and public attention to Afghanistan is getting higher in Japan 
now.  On the other hand, Afghanistan in a trouble is a least recipient of the foreign 
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assistance while it needs far more fund to tackle its problems such as security 
improvement, governance, and reconstruction.  I am wondering why Japan does not try 
to increase its assistance level in the financial term. 
 
3. Strategy 
 
Japan had a strategy towards the post war situation of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001: to 
support the effort by Mr. L. Brahimi, United Nation Secretary General’s Special 
Representative for Afghanistan to create a road for reconciliation and creation of a 
democratic government for all Afghans; and to create a reconstruction process popping 
up the political process. 
 
After the reconstruction process started and the Bonn agreement was concluded, Japan 
developed a strategy for its assistance by setting priorities and making three pillars as 
mentioned above.  Japan assumed that by making programs based on this strategy as a 
major promoter for creation of the reconstruction process it could properly contribute to 
peace and stability of Afghanistan. 
 
The examples of assistance programs for this strategy were the followings: financial 
support for holding events stipulated in the Bonn agreement and technical support for 
broadcasting Emergency Loya Jirga (Gran d National Assembly) in the political 
process; support for DDR, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as lead 
nation in the security sector; and ‘the Ogata Initiative (OI)’, a comprehensive area 
development program and trunk road rehabilitation in reconstruction.  
 
As you see in the volume of assistance, Japan seems not to have changed this strategy 
too.  Japan recently announced its financial assistance to the presidential election 
scheduled to hold in coming August.  This can be categorized as a support for the 
political sector.  Japan has supported DIAG, disbandment of illegal armed groups, 
which is seen as a program complement to DDR in the security sector.  The assistance 
to police reform can be seen as a new program but Japan has provided assistance to the 
police sector since 2002.  A briefing paper of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, ‘Japan’s 
Assistance in Afghanistan: Achievements’ notes infrastructure, basic human needs, and 
agriculture and rural development as sectors for its humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance, but all the programs in these sectors are in the same line drawn in 2002. 
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The situation, especially security situation in Afghanistan has dramatically changed 
from the time of creation of the Japanese strategy on assistance to the country.  
Accordingly, the posture of the international assistance to Afghanistan has also changed.  
The role of the ISAF and UNAMA is getting larger and significant in assistance to the 
Government of Afghanistan.  And the United States, the primary international actor, 
has been reviewing its strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan in consultation with 
Afghanistan and its allies since the inception of the new administration.  It is the time 
for Japan to review its strategy and change it in accordance with the ground needs for 
the international efforts.   
 
4. Local Coordination 
 
In every sector for nation-building of Afghanistan, coordination among the players from 
the Afghan official and private organizations and institutions, and the international civil 
and military communities has become very important.  Each sector and each program 
has committees and sub committees with a secretariat.  Those main and sub 
committees and a secretariat are participated in or staffed by governmental officials and 
officers, donor diplomats and experts, officials and experts of international 
organizations, and officers and civilian representatives of the ISAF and OEF-A.  
 
This kind of coordination is conducted not only in the capital but also at provincial and 
district levels, which turns usually into formation of collaboration at each level.  And 
as a result, only those who participate in coordination can participate in actual 
collaboration. 
 
Japan has worked as lead nation in DDR and DIAG and held three international 
conferences on either DDR or DIAG in Tokyo.  However, Japan is short of eligible 
personnel to participate in works of the committees and ANBP, Afghanistan’s New 
Beginning Program.  As a result of that, Japanese contribution to DIAG is little seen 
except the financial one.  Even the large part of the financial assistance is used for the 
DIAG-related rural development, according to the ANBP report.  
 
In humanitarian and reconstruction sectors, such shortage of personnel has been 
resolved by the efforts of the JICA office and its individual experts.  In the medical and 
health care sector, this was very obvious to the eyes of the program assessment team 
which I participated in.  However, it is very difficult for a JICA expert to go outside 
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Kabul and specific large cities and almost impossible to stay for technical cooperation 
in local cities due to the security reason, which means that Japanese experts can not 
participate in local coordination. 
 
5. Capacity 
 
I had misunderstood the term ‘technical cooperation’ until the recent time.  The 
Japanese expression of Gijutsu Kyouryoku, which is usually translated into ‘technical 
cooperation’, indicates training courses either in Japan or in other countries including a 
recipient country and capacity building of institutions in a certain sector.  In contrast, it 
seems that ‘technical cooperation’ in Western countries means assessment by an expert 
on specific field.  The western experts come and make assessment reports and go back 
home. 
 
The JICA technical assistance was once criticized as ineffective in the context of need 
for more direct assistance.  A JICA expert has never become an assistant to Afghan 
senior officials or a researcher just to make an assessment report.  Almost all the 
experts have worked for training Afghan nationals or for helping capacity building of 
institutions.  This criticism is irrelevant.  JICA has trained hundreds of teachers, 
doctors, nurses, midwives, radiograph experts, and technicians in other sectors. 
 
Having said so, I have to admit that Japan lacks experts for certain areas.  As for DDR, 
Japan has failed to send a senior expert to the ANBP in addition to failure to fill the post 
of Prof. K. Isezaki, who made a tremendous contribution to the initiation of DDR as a 
senior expert.  This results in lack of personnel in coordination of DDR and DIAG in 
the committees and secretariat.  This may be due to insufficiency of senior military 
experts for peace building operation who can speak foreign languages.  Now that Japan 
Self-Defense Force (JSDF) accumulated the experiences on peace keeping and peace 
building operations, it is the time for it to produce eligible military experts for this kind 
of activities. 
 
In other sectors other than DDR and DIAG, Japan failed to send a senior expert to 
advise the higher Afghan authorities.  Senior advisors on macro-economy and finance 
were needed from the first stage of nation-building of this country but Japan failed to 
bring such a senior expert.  Japan has a lot of experiences to develop economy and has 
a lot of economic advisors.  If selection system for such an expert had been established, 
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Japan could have succeeded in posting a senior economic advisor in the Ministry of 
Finance or the Presidential office. 
 
6. Afghanistan’s Ownership 
 
One of the largest problems for promoting the OI was how to build Afghan-driven 
nature in the program.  As mentioned above, the OI aimed at comprehensive area 
development by UN humanitarian agencies with around US$ 100 million.  During the 
transitional government period, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Minister of Finance closely watched 
humanitarian and reconstruction programs offered and implemented by foreign 
governments and UN agencies which might harm Afghanistan’s ownership, and if he 
found one, he tried to take every measures to stop it or to make it hold Afghan-driven 
nature. 
 
In the case of the OI, MRRD, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development led all 
the actors working under the program.  MRRD developed a variety of NDPs, national 
development programs such as NSP, National Solidarity Program and NABDAP, 
National Area-Based Development Program.  In coordination and cooperation with the 
Japanese Embassy in Kabul and UNAMA, MRRD held a workshop and following 
meetings attended by officials from local governments and local UN agencies’ offices 
and succeeded in making the OI serve NDPs, especially NSP and NABDAP. 
 
According to Japan’s ODA guideline, Japan provides an ODA project when a recipient 
country requests it.  In this sense, respect for ownership of a recipient country is not 
alien to Japan.  The point in the OI was how to realize a comprehensive area 
development with Afghan-driven nature while local government institutions and 
officials did not have sufficient capacity to plan, implement, and assess a development 
project.  The workshop gave participants, especially local government officials a 
precious opportunity to share a vision and to learn how to plan and assess projects. 
 
However, only a part of the project proposals made by workshop participants was 
financed by Japan’s headquarters partly because of lack of coordination in Japanese 
bureaucracy and partly because of lack of the proper fund in the budget for the recovery 
phase of post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
The lessons on ownership in the OI are the followings: 
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1) Foreign and International Agencies tend to plan programs and projects presuming no 
or little capacity for nation building and to overlook local ability to contribute to it; 
2) Workshops at both central and local levels can serve sharing a vision among foreign 
assistance experts and government officials and give an opportunity to educate both 
of them on how to work together; and 
3) The officials working in the capital tend to put priority on forming projects, not 
understanding the importance of local-driven projects for self-development of a 
post-conflict country.  
 
Afghanistan’s Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy both presume 
Afghanistan’s ownership of its nation-building.  Under these frameworks, many 
committees, sub-committees and secretariats work at central and local levels.  These 
institutes are not just a measure for coordination but also a tool for realizing ownership 
by the Afghans.  I do not know cases of other countries and international organizations.  
But if Japan wants to implement its projects contributing to Afghanistan’s 
nation-building, the officials at every level in the capital should learn roles for 
committees, sub-committees and secretariats and the reason for their creation.  
Otherwise, Japan will not play a role for Afghanistan’s nation building other than that of 
fund provider. 
 
7. Security 
 
The deteriorating security situation has been the largest threat to reconstruction 
assistance.  The Japanese government is extremely cautious about security for its 
rehabilitation projects.  Japan does not have its own intelligence apparatus to judge the 
security in a country such as Afghanistan but tends to rely on intelligence reports 
provided by allied or friendly countries. The final judgment on the security situation for 
a reconstruction project is made by Tokyo, although the local Japanese embassy can 
express its own view.  Any casualty, whether it is human or property, is unacceptable 
during implementation of a reconstruction project. 
 
This attitude of Japan affected reconstruction activities: 
1) Word of a threat to the Japanese research team working on the trunk road 
rehabilitation project came from an allied country, prompting an immediate 
withdrawal of the team and a three-month suspension of the project. This resulted in 
reducing the planned 150 km section to 50km and in assigning to Japan an 
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additional 115km of road rehabilitation; 
2) As the security situation has worsened, however, JICA’s assistance activities have 
been limited to the large cities in the northern and central regions of the country. As 
of the end of June 2008 JICA does not allow its experts to work in rural areas, and 
conducts trainers’ training in Kabul, sending Afghan Trainees to Japan. 
 
The Japanese Embassy in Afghanistan developed security measures for the road 
rehabilitation project before work started in August 2003.  These measures covered 
information gathering and analysis; protection by the local police and private security, 
and the patrol and emergency evacuation plans of the US forces within coalition force; 
and efforts to win the support of local people for the projects.  During the rehabilitation 
of the 50km road east from Kandahar, all the measures worked well but the key was 
support by the local people.  The local people benefitted greatly in employment and 
improvement of social and economic facilities from the road rehabilitation and small 
projects for the district where the rehabilitating trunk road passes.  They extended their 
support to the Japanese projects to protect their interests.  Furthermore, as the 
Embassy’s contacts with district shura (council) increased, so did the information on the 
situation of rural areas and the way of thinking of local people.   
 
Unfortunately, the security situation worsened far more than the time I was posted in 
Afghanistan (2002-2004).  As a result, Japan withdrew all the staff both in the public 
and private sectors stationed in Kandahar.  It is supposed that all but a Japanese 
security company working for the 115km road rehabilitation project has no contact with 
local communities, leading to no original local information.  This lack of original 
security information is not only in Kandahar but also in Nangarhar.  At the end of 
August last year, one Japanese aid worker, Mr. Kazuya Ito of Peshawar-Kai, a Japanese 
NGO, was kidnapped and finally found to be killed in the northwest of that province.  
At that time, the Embassy got information only from the central government.  In 
2002-2004, the Embassy was able to make a direct contact with the NGO and to get 
direct information from the provincial government and police.  In addition, the 
Japanese Embassy developed a very friendly relationship with the present governor of 
Nangarhar province, Mr. Guru Agha Sherzai when he was the governor of Kandahar 
province. 
 
It is concluded that Japan has not only withdrawn Japanese assistance workers but also 
cut the information network on security.  If Japan continues to hold this attitude, it will 
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not be in a position to contribute to security improvement except through fund, which is 
requested by the United States and NATO.  For Japan cannot dispatch any military unit 
operating outside the ISAF bases because of constitutional and political reasons and 
thus the remaining measure Japan could take for contributing to improvement of the 
present security situation is to connect the local communities including tribal ones and 
the ISAF, which needs a change of the attitude of Japan.   
 
I strongly recommend activation of the Japanese contacts nurtured in the past including 
those before 2001 and posting proper personnel able to do in Afghanistan for 
contributing to the work of ISAF and the Afghan government. 
(End) 
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